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The aim of this policy paper is to explain the mechanism and consequences of repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 and withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights.
The key points of the policy paper are:
• The Human Rights Act could be repealed by Act of Parliament.
• Any attempt to repeal and/or replace the Human Rights Act would have to take into account the devolution settlement. • If the Human Rights Act were not replaced, individuals would still be able to rely on common law remedies, as far as they exist, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in cases in which the UK has acted within the scope of EU law. Hence, in some areas repealing of the Human Rights Act without replacement will not lead to the 'regaining of sovereignty' anticipated by the proponents of such proposals. If the UK remains a party to the European Convention on Human Rights the right to lodge a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights will still exist. The UK courts will not have a chance to deal with certain human rights issues internally as they will be escalated to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
• A replacement of the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights would enable Parliament to provide for the protection of additional rights, such as a right to trial by jury. It would also allow Parliament to introduce certain procedural changes, such as no longer making it mandatory for courts 'to take into account' the case law of the European Court of Human Rights or to read legislation 'as far as it is possible to do so' compatibly with Convention rights. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has relaxed the conditions under which courts are required to follow the European Court of Human Rights and that a removal of these requirements could result in an increased number of cases brought against the UK in the European Court of Human Rights.
• The UK would not be able to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights while remaining a party to the European Convention on
Human Rights, unless the Convention was amended. This would require the consent of all forty-seven contracting parties to the Convention.
• A complete withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights would deprive people in the UK from the possibility of bringing their human rights complaints to the European Court of Human Rights.
o However, it would not relieve the UK of the duty to comply with judgments already handed down by the European Court of Human Rights, for instance on prisoner voting.
o The UK would also be setting a negative example so that the protection of human rights within Europe as a whole would suffer.
• Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights is technically possible with six months' notice, however it would lead to wider consequences for the UK's other international commitments.
o Long-term membership of the Council of Europe may become impossible.
o A withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights may be incompatible with the UK's commitments as a member of the European Union.
• Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights could result in a substantial reduction of human rights protection for minority and vulnerable groups in the UK.
Foreword by the editors
The general election of 7 May 2015 has returned a Conservative government and, as a consequence, the Conservative Party's plans for reforming human rights law in the United
Kingdom are likely to become reality. It is therefore important to discuss some of the legal implications of a repeal of the Human Rights Act and a withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights. Detailed discussions can already be found in numerous legal publications and many more are certain to follow in the near future. This paper provides an overview of some of the many legal questions that the Conservative Party's plans raise and attempts to provide some answers to these highly complex questions. It is deliberately kept short and does not claim to be exhaustive.
This policy paper is the product of a one-day workshop held at Edinburgh Law School on 
General introduction
On 3 October 2014, the Conservative Party published its policy document 'Protecting Human Rights in the UK' which sets out its proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998
(HRA) and replace it with a new 'British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities'. In addition, the policy document also raised the prospect that the UK might withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The policy document outlines three main problems with the HRA:
• First, the HRA is said to undermine the role of UK courts when deciding human rights cases. The requirement that national judges 'take into account' European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence is said to lead to the application of 'problematic Strasbourg jurisprudence' in UK law.
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• Second, it is said that the HRA 'undermines the sovereignty of Parliament, and democratic accountability to the public.' 2 Although the HRA affirms the sovereignty of Parliament, it is alleged that the requirement in section 3(1) of the HRA to interpret legislation in a way which is compatible with ECHR rights, 'so far as it is possible to do so', has led to UK courts going to 'artificial lengths to change the meaning of legislation so that it complies with their interpretation of Convention rights'.
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• Third, the HRA is said to go beyond what is necessary under the ECHR because the ECHR does not require the UK to have any particular legal mechanism for securing ECHR rights, to directly incorporate ECHR rights into UK law, or to make ECtHR jurisprudence directly binding on domestic courts.
The position on the UK's continued membership of the ECHR is less clearly formulated. Rights would be designed to achieve -such as to ensuring 'that our Armed Forces overseas are not subject to persistent human rights claims' 6 or preventing 'terrorists and other serious foreign criminals who pose a threat to our society from using spurious human rights arguments to prevent deportation' 7 -could run counter to the ECHR, and as a result, make long-term membership of the ECHR difficult. 8 Both of these commitments are inconsistent with current ECtHR case law.
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This policy paper examines how a repeal of the HRA and a withdrawal from the ECHR could be effected and some of the significant consequences this would have for 1) human rights protection in the UK, and 2) the UK's international commitments.
Introduction
In this part of the policy paper we will first examine how a repeal of the HRA might be achieved and, second, explore possibilities for what it could be replaced with. This part of the paper works on the assumption that the UK would remain a member of the Council of Europe, be bound by the ECHR, and be a member of the European Union.
1. How would repeal of the HRA take effect?
Procedural steps
Complete repeal of the HRA could be achieved by passing an Act of Parliament.
Some of the aims contained in the Conservative Party policy document could also be achieved by passing an Act of Parliament amending the HRA. For instance, the policy document formulates the aim of making judgments of the ECtHR 'no longer binding over the UK Supreme Court'. This aim seems to be directed at section 2 (1) of the HRA, which contains the requirement that courts 'take into account' the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
It should be pointed out that the suggestion that judgments of the ECtHR 'are binding' on the Supreme Court is flawed given that the clear wording of section 2 (1) HRA shows that they are not strictly binding in domestic law. Nonetheless, it would be possible to remove this requirement from the HRA by way of an amendment (although this would not change the binding character of ECtHR judgments under international law if they were handed down in cases brought against the UK). Certain adjustments to the HRA are therefore possible without the need to repeal the Act as whole. As a consequence, any amendments to the HRA may substantially change the operation of current HRA protections.
Implications of the devolution settlement
The HRA applies to all of the devolved nations of the UK, but is also embedded in the devolution settlement. For instance, section 29 (2) of the Scotland Act 1998 states:
A provision is outside that competence so far as any of the following paragraphs 
What might the HRA be replaced with?
This section discusses the two main options available to a government seeking to repeal (rather than amend) the HRA: first, that the HRA is repealed and no legislation is enacted to replace it; second, that the HRA is repealed and replaced with a British Bill of Rights or a similarly named Act of Parliament.
No replacement of the HRA
Were the UK to repeal the HRA it could still remain a party to the ECHR. Repeal of the HRA would not automatically place the UK in breach of the ECHR. However, the main challenge before the entry into force of the HRA in 2000 was that it was often not 21 Stormont House Agreement (2014), para 31. possible for individuals to rely on ECHR rights in domestic courts. Prior to the HRA, domestic courts were more restricted in the types of remedies they could award a claimant and, as a result, could not always avoid breaches of ECHR rights. The HRA thus had the effect of 'bringing rights home'.
Common law protection
Before the entry into force of the HRA civil liberties were protected under the common law, but this protection was weak and inferior to that provided by the HRA. If the HRA were to be repealed and not replaced, there is no guarantee of a return to the situation before it entered into force. While initially, courts were reluctant to develop an autonomous rights jurisdiction, there appears to have been a shift in recent years. UK courts increasingly reference common law rights in their judgments, as opposed to those of the ECHR. This is evidenced in a number of cases.
In in some contexts it may also be inspired by the Convention rights and jurisprudence (the protection of privacy being a notable example). And in time, of course, a synthesis may emerge. But the natural starting point in any dispute is to start with domestic law, and it is certainly not to focus exclusively on the Convention rights, without surveying the wider common law scene.
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This is also evident in terms of the remedies that the courts utilise, not just the substantive standards. In Jones v Secretary of State for Justice, 24 the Administrative Court used the remedies available in administrative law rather than turn to the HRA. Instead of examining the proportionality of the ban on a prisoner's books, the court examined whether the action was irrational. This ground of review would be available were the HRA repealed, although it does provide for the same depth of scrutiny as proportionality.
It is therefore possible that repeal of the HRA will not mean a return to the position before it entered into force. There is some evidence to suggest that the common law appears to have been influenced by the HRA and altered because of it. However, the protection offered by the common law (still) suffers from a number of inherent weaknesses and it therefore cannot be suggested that the common law would be able to offer a human rights protection that is equivalent to the HRA. First, Statutes are able to override common law rights when the Statute is clear and express. Second, it is difficult to identify the content of a common law right and consequently it can be difficult to prove that it has been breached. Moreover, proportionality as a ground for substantive review might no longer form a part of UK law. This might be seen as detrimental for individuals seeking judicial review given that it is a more intrusive form of review than those available in traditional English administrative law such as irrationality and unreasonableness. Procedurally speaking, common law rights are less securely protected as UK courts have neither got a power to construe national measures as 'far as possible' (as under section 3 HRA) nor can they make a declaration of incompatibility (as under section 4 HRA).
Common law protection is therefore welcome as an additional protection, but cannot be a substitute for positive protection of rights by Statute.
EU law protection
Should the UK remain a member of the EU, this provides an avenue through which ECHR 
Replacement with a British Bill of Rights
The Conservative Party argues for a replacement of the HRA with a British Bill of Rights.
At one point there seemed to be cross-party consensus on the idea, 29 though this now seems to have waned.
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This section considers what a British Bill of Rights would mean for the UK, premised on the assumption that the HRA would be repealed rather than supplemented. Should the UK seek to depart from ECtHR jurisprudence on these issues, the UK would be in breach of the ECHR. 34 In practical terms it means that even if the national court is not going to find a violation of human rights, the applicant will be able to bring the claim to the ECtHR which will apply its higher standards and find a violation if such exists. This will only prolong the process and might cause the UK embarrassment in Strasbourg.
Advantages and disadvantages of a British Bill of Rights

Potential substantive changes in a British Bill of Rights
There 38 Having said that, it is more likely that the British Bill of Rights will curtail the existing rights rather than offer new enhanced levels of protection. 47 Lord Phillips stated:
Potential procedural changes of a British Bill of Rights
The requirement to "take into account" the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally result in this Court applying principles that are clearly established by the Strasbourg Court. There will, however, be rare occasions where this court has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In such
circumstances it is open to this court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course.
Similarly in Manchester CC v Pinnock Lord Neuberger stated:
The court is not bound to respect every decision of the [ECtHR] . Not only would it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the European court which is of value to the development of Convention law. 48 In Pinnock Lord Neuberger defined considerably more relaxed conditions under which UK courts are expected to follow the ECtHR:
Where, however, there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this Court not to follow that line [emphasis added].
These more flexible interpretations of section 2 have recently been confirmed in the case of Chester and McGeoch. 50 For these reasons the Conservative Party's assumption that the case law of the ECtHR is binding on UK courts and that the Supreme Court is not supreme does not accurately reflect their current approach, so that the usefulness of a removal of section 2 HRA can be called into doubt. In addition, the criteria developed in Pinnock provide the UK courts with a good degree of flexibility, which can form the basis for a dialogue with the ECtHR on whether one of its judgments is correct. 51 This has happened, for instance, in
Horncastle. 52 The UK Supreme Court decided not to follow an ECtHR precedent 53 which seemed to suggest the unqualified inadmissibility of hearsay evidence in a criminal trial because following it would have undermined 'the whole domestic scheme for ensuring fair trials'. 54 The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR subsequently took these concerns into consideration and relaxed its own approach. The increasing contracting-out and privatization of public services has led to problems in defining 'functions of a public nature'. 56 A Bill of Rights for the UK could take the opportunity to clarify this. It should be noted, however, that all of these procedural changes could equally be effected by amending the HRA.
Conclusion
The 
Arguments for and against a withdrawal of the UK from the ECHR
Arguments for withdrawal
A number of arguments are advanced in favour of a withdrawal of the UK from the ECHR. Some relate to the workings of the ECtHR, such as its heavy caseload and resulting massive backlog of cases; it is in need of more lawyers in the registry, greater financial resources and clearer admissibility rules. 57 It is not these problems, however, which form the crux of arguments pushing for UK withdrawal from the ECHR.
At the heart of the debate over withdrawal is the sovereignty of the UK. It is argued that UK courts have become subservient to the ECtHR and that by being a member of the ECHR, the UK is bound by international law to comply with the judgments of the ECtHR and faces political consequences if not. This came to a head in cases regarding the ban on all convicted prisoners voting whilst in prison 58 as well as the prohibition on whole life sentences without the possibility of re-evaluation. 59 However, it is submitted that on closer inspection these are not strong enough arguments to militate in favour of withdrawal. As far as prisoner voting and whole life sentences are concerned, the impact of these judgments might be more limited than is often considered. Small changes to the status quo would most probably suffice to satisfy the requirements of the ECHR.
Moreover, it should be recalled that the relationship between UK courts and the ECtHR is a matter of domestic law, chiefly the interpretative obligation in section 2(1) of the HRA.
As noted above however, the UK courts have moved on somewhat from the position in Ullah where they considered themselves bound to 'mirror' Strasbourg jurisprudence.
There is an increased assertion of common law rights and cases such as Horncastle and
Pinnock demonstrate how the ECtHR takes on board the opinions of domestic courts. In addition, if changes were desirable these could be brought in by amending the relevant provisions of the HRA.
What is more, as regards the role of the ECtHR sitting above the UK and exercising jurisdiction under the ECHR, the latter is likely to be reformed to contain an amendment to its preamble expressly referring to the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity in the Preamble to the ECHR.
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Consequently the ECtHR has been said to be entering 'a new era in the life of the Convention, an age of subsidiarity, in which the emphasis is on States' primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention'. 61
Arguments against withdrawal
If the UK were to withdraw from the ECHR, those under the jurisdiction of the UK would no longer be able to bring their human rights complaints to the ECtHR. Moreover, the UK would no longer be bound to comply with the ECHR under international law.
Apart from reducing the human rights protections for individuals, there is also a broader systemic argument that the UK ought not to withdraw from the ECHR due to the damaging impact this might have on human rights protection in Europe in general. 
The procedure for withdrawal
Withdrawal from the ECHR is not the only option the UK might pursue. The UK could attempt to push for further reforms of the ECHR, e.g. in order to achieve that judgments were only declaratory. However, a withdrawal from only the ECtHR's jurisdiction would have been performed by it before the date at which the denunciation became effective. The UK would cease to be bound by the ECHR once its denunciation becomes effective.
However, it would remain bound by the ECHR for violations which occurred before that date. Crucially, it would still need to comply with all the judgments handed down against it in the past. This would, for instance, include the controversial Hirst judgment on prisoner voting rights. 
What would be the wider consequences?
A withdrawal from the ECHR would not happen in isolation and yield further consequences for membership in the Council of Europe and of the European Union.
Moreover, the human rights protection for individuals would suffer. Once a country is a member of the European Union it is obliged to respect the values of the EU, which include 'respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights'. 70 There is no express requirement that a Member
Continued membership of the Council of Europe
State remain a party to the ECHR and no EU Member State has so far withdrawn from the ECHR so that there is no practice on which one could draw. At the same time it would not be logical if membership of the ECHR were a precondition for becoming a member of the EU, there would be no parallel requirement to remain one for the duration of a country's membership of the EU. This would suggest that being a party to the ECHR continues to be an implied obligation throughout EU membership even though it is not expressly laid down in the EU Treaties. Hence there are good reasons to suggest that if the United Kingdom withdrew from the ECHR, it would equally be in breach of its obligations as an EU Member State so that a continued membership in the EU might not be possible.
Impact on human rights protection
This section focuses on whether denunciation of and withdrawal from the ECHR would lead to a lowering of human rights protection. It uses the lens of anti-terrorism legislation and gay and lesbian rights to analyse this. 
Gay and lesbian rights
In terms of gay men and lesbians' rights, the impact of withdrawal from the ECHR could be profound. Withdrawing from the ECHR would remove vital legal protections that have been built up over the last three decades. A number of key legal reforms in the UK, which have ensured the equal treatment of gay men and lesbians, have been the result of litigation in the ECtHR. These reforms include the decriminalization of male homosexual acts, 71 reform of the 'age of consent' for male homosexual acts, 72 the removal of the ban on homosexuals serving in the armed forces, 73 and equality of treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation in the setting of child maintenance. 74 The ECHR protects gay men and lesbians from regressive action by future UK governments that may seek to 'roll back' these important developments in human rights protection.
The ECHR also protects gay men and lesbians from non-state actors. For example, the ECHR has been essential in safeguarding UK legislation designed to ensure equal treatment of gay men and lesbians in respect of the provision of goods and services.
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This is an important protective function that might be lost should the UK withdraw from the ECHR.
Withdrawing from the ECHR would also prevent the UK from helping to improve the human rights situation of gay men and lesbians in Europe as a whole. For example, whilst the UK is contracted to the ECHR it is part of an emerging consensus in Europe about the need to provide legal recognition of same-sex relationships. The UK's legal recognition of same-sex relationships was cited by the ECtHR in Vallianatos and Others v Greece when it held that denying same-sex couples access to a 'civil union' was a violation of the ECHR. 
Counter-terrorism legislation
In terms of counter-terrorism legislation, the pressing question is whether withdrawal from the ECHR would alter the extent to which the government would be limited by rights, even in the most pressing times. Membership of the Council of Europe and the ECHR have been instrumental in a shift from the situation in which governments were fairly unrestrained to an acceptance that legitimation and justification were necessary for counter-terrorism measures. The ECHR has since provided an important tool for advocates in terms of arguing at a policy level about what kind of measures states ought to introduce or, rather, ought not to introduce in spite of perceived exigency.
The ECtHR has not necessarily always enforced a situation of 'optimal' rights enforcement. For instance, Article 15 ECHR provides for derogation in time of emergency and the ECtHR has been particularly deferential to the interpretations of states here.
Arguably, following A v UK the concept of an emergency could be construed as of endless duration, for example. 77 The ECHR however does provide an important safeguard in spite of this deferential attitude towards determining whether or not an emergency exists. For instance, as regards Article 3 of the ECHR the ECtHR has held firm against moves to undermine this in the UK. It has continued to enforce the principle from Chahal v UK that a person may not be deported to a country where they will face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. 78 This occurred most notably in the furore around the attempted deportation of Abu Qatada. 79 Hence withdrawal from the ECHR would reduce the ability of individuals confronted with anti-terror legislation to complain to an international court tasked with protecting these rights.
Conclusion
A withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the ECHR would deprive people in the UK from the possibility of taking their human rights complaints to the ECtHR. This would be accompanied by a substantial reduction of human rights protection, in particular for minority and vulnerable groups. Importantly, withdrawal would not relieve the UK of the
